Microsoft 365 outage leads to chlorine gas poisoning of 15 hotel guests
Discussion 161 comments
There isn’t one root cause here or one person or entity at fault. Many things went wrong and bad choices were made by many people and entities to lead us to this point, and they ought to be all regarded seriously and addressed rigorously.
- Whomever at the hotel that approved this as the sole (or even primary) alert system is at fault. - The lack of training and experience this hotel employee had when in a position to make such a dangerous choice was at fault. - Ditto the alarm company - everyone involved in designing, approving, and implementing this system is at fault, as well as whatever process ensured that nobody had the experience or safety to be able to speak up about this dangerous design is at fault. - The regulatory system that allowed this design is at fault. - The health and safety inspection system that didn’t catch this risk is at fault.
I’m sure there’s more; I’m just spitballing here. But the point is that there’s no one person or thing to blame here, and no one fix. This should kick off a wave of personal and professional soul-searching and improvements.
What if the person who reads the email was gone that day? What if they forget to read it? What if the email system is down? What if it was lost? This is just careless and bad design.
At the very least you need a backup notification, like say a warning siren or noise at the pool? Probably you don't want to do that casually because "it could scare people".
It's not some tricky thing where you had multiple ways to detect it, giving some redundancy. Same thing if it was a text message only or a phone call only.
This is a poor safety design with a single failure mode on the notification.
More properly said, you may cause panic. People genuinely don't know how to respond when they hear an alarm in an unfamiliar place.
And that's if you're lucky. I once had to deal with people who did not want to evacuate a building when a fire alarm went off. And when I got them out the door I had trouble convincing them to leave the building's deck. Some people seem to think that it is okay to ignore a fire alarm, even a probable false alarm, in a wood structure with a wood deck.
Also, I have a personal domain, some sites decided its not real enough and I can't get email from them.
Email is just not reliable. It could be part of a combined system of other things that are reliable.
We've been through this with smoke detectors, it's not a new thing.
This is not the case in aviation. Even in the most egregiously obvious single-cause failures, there's always an analysis of issues in the wider system that allowed that single cause to become the single cause in the first place.
I agree with your points, though. In this case, Microsoft absolutely takes shared responsibility. It is only a matter of time until a similar outage in some other wider networked system with a so-called 'five/seven/nine nines uptime guarantee' goes out for a couple of days, and takes with it some critical life-sustaining system, and people die.
yeah, these companies need to be told to stop relying on cloud services for everything.
its wild to me how many critical things that absolutely do not need the internet are relying on the internet.
much blame to go around here:
- whoever designed the stupid alert system.
- the marketing departments in countless companies ignoring engineers when they market to normie customers “connect everything”
- the hotel company for seemingly doing no dilligence at all. and just blindly listening to some salesman “connect everything”
- accountant types and their “we can save pennie’s if we cut all of these corners.” and the stupid corners they choose to cut.
- etc…
on a macro scale it’s amazing to me how many people are victims to slimey car salesman types leading to situations like this.
Similar to doing regular restores of your data backups. If you never test a restore, you don't have a backup.
Countless systems are relying on email as a means to alert people to issues, for better or worse. Having a physical alarm for everything is rarely practical for a myriad of reasons.
I worked in a data center 20 years ago that had alarms on the wall for when the halon was preparing to be released for fire suppression. There are likely dozens of things that could be monitored, but it was only the catastrophic thing that once it started, there was no stopping it, that got lights on the wall.
Too many loud alarms make people start ignoring alarms. I would guess that there is a fairly large margin of error in pools before there is a health risk, so it likely wasn't deemed alarm worthy. As someone who's been in a pool before, I'd also imagine that people would notice and say something, or it would be unpleasant enough to not want to spend time in it. That's what I find most surprising... that people weren't immediately turned off just being around it, to the point of staying out.
> the user of the pool should be able to notice that something wrong by them self.
Clearly, their motivations for autonomous self-preservation were insufficient.
The hotel picked a monitoring solution which relies exclusively on email, or configured it like that. If anything they are absolutely both to blame but for different things. The company for designing a safety related system like this, the hotel for selecting an inadequate solution/configuration thus allowing their guests to be harmed.
> But it is accurate to say that the cause of the issue was the outage
The cause of the issue is the more immediate one - the configuration of the monitoring system. This avoids going up the causality chain to far - shitty coffee caused engineer to take down email system, and such.
Not one but two of the hotel's systems failed to operate properly. The chlorine pumping system pumped too much chlorine and the last resort alarm failed to alert.
As I said, there's plenty of blame to go around as a matter of general principle. But for what happened here the hotel bears the responsibility towards their guests, not the pumping or monitoring system developers, not Microsoft. The only reason MS in the title is because that failure is big news these days.
On a technical note, even if they had a backup email provider they'd still be screwed because the people getting the alert were probably employees on the single provider (back to SPOF). SMS could have been a good parallel option. Ideally also some physical control panel that triggers an alarm when any safety critical condition occurs. On the chlorine pumping system, that shouldn't be a dumb preprogrammed pump, it should come with it's own sensors and detection loop independent of any external system, something that proactively stops it before it breaches the safety limits.
Using the unqualified "cause" is misleading click bait and in some places it could get you sued
1. Can there not just be a light / siren right next to the gas sensors? Easy to fix, but it requires hardware changes on-site.
2. Could Microsoft have not had an outage? Hard to fix.
3. Could they use some better notifications systems like idk self-hosted ntfy.sh with a warning if the server goes down? Yes but nobody wants to pay for that.
And you have to check those lights and sirens that they still work.
Everybody knew email was down.
The real problem is nobody thought of the consequences regarding the alarm system
Yes, they still have to work but first off, both of those are extremely reliable systems, alarm circuits have extremely low risk of failure. Second, testing them takes 5 minutes a week/month, press the button, look for flashing light and listen to wailing noise.
It's inexcusable to think that email/slack or whatever is acceptable as anything other than notification system so people not in facility can be notified that alarms are going off.
EDIT: You are defending this setup and I'm not sure why. This seems email only setup seem indefensible.
Testing requires staff and you can be sure those parks are understaffed.
Best thing is to avoid them, next best thing is a cheap solution with low maintenance by the staff to notify as much people as possible.
Email wins.
Not a good solution but the best you will get for the price they are willing to pay
I'm surprised an e-mail only alert is even legal for this. Or is chlorine level monitoring not something that is regulated?
Disclaimer: I work in Azure, this is not a defense of the outage and I didn't read the submitted article.
If I built a chlorine tank out of toothpicks and duct tape, and it leaks everywhere and kills people, you don't publish a headline that says DuctTape and Global Toothpicks Inc are responsible for chlorine deaths.
> So no one noticed that the maintenance safety system of the sauna landscape has long since sounded the alarm by mail. Because the automatic dosing system had pumped too much chlorine into the pool.
I’m so sorry.
Anything that could result in that sort of harm should have a more resilient and redundant architecture.
> 15 guests injured at Phantasialand
> Due to the (Microsoft) disruption, no emails were received, as the company informed WDR on Saturday. As a result, no one was aware that the sauna area's maintenance safety system had already issued an email alert. This was because the automatic dosing system had pumped too much chlorine into the pool.
Like, what leads a teenager to do such things?
https://www.science.org/content/blog-post/things-i-won-t-wor...
https://www.science.org/content/blog-post/things-i-won-t-wor...
https://www.science.org/content/blog-post/things-i-won-t-wor...
https://www.science.org/content/blog-post/things-i-won-t-wor...
> With one experiment, he created chloroform and as the book encouraged him to sniff the chemical, he did so and was unconscious for more than an hour, according to his recollection.
> During the incident, some of the gas monitors installed within the Yenkin-Majestic facility detected the flammable solvent release approximately one minute after the release began and sent an email to an offsite employee, but the monitors did not sound audible alarms to warn employees of the hazard.
1 dead, 8 non-fatally injured.
It appears that the hotel is trying to duck liability by latching onto the outage as the root cause even though this happened before the outage.
Why does it matter that the service someone is paying for is an api or something else versus email? The email service failed. First and foremost Microsoft’s service failed. It doesn’t matter HOW it should be engineered.
Microsoft has many other offerings for such things, ranging from some services inside Azure to software (like operating systems) intended for real-time use on on-premises hardware.
Posting a bunch of semi-fake out of context images on New York Times should be investigated, really. Same goes for that "classified" leak they've reported. This wiped out billions from the market, disparaged multiple woman (who likely wanted nothing to do with the reporters), affected travel for tens of thousands, now this gas poisoning.
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- External system polls the monitor and records levels.
- Local system reaches out to external system and fetches status.
- Someone has the responsibility to do rounds and record the status indicated by the local system.
External system down or indicates unacceptable levels, monitor unreachable, etc.? Local system shows a failure. Investigate. Local system down? Investigate.
You can even add redundancy by having a manager double check that the responsible employee is checking off the status plus the manager can do a daily sweep as a fallback. Throw something like PagerDuty into the mix and have multi-channel notifications on any failure that escalate over time.
In reality such system would end up sending email notification because it's just too complex.
I'd hope we can do better tho.
This seems like a solved problem, e.g. for smoke detectors.
The alarms and lights are easy to test, too. Make pressing the self-test button part of the nightly or weekly rounds.
It can be very much in-band, like a fire alarm primarily also is.
"As a result, no one was aware that the sauna area's maintenance safety system had already issued an email alert. This was because the automatic dosing system had pumped too much chlorine into the pool."
We're in an era where alarms go out via email, major policy changes are announced on Truth Social, and war is declared on X/Twitter.
This was bad system design. Hopefully people learn that safety critical services can't rely on Microsoft which they also tell you not to do.
What caused what? There is a story in Mahabharatha where Arjuna was claiming that he achieved killing of Karna. Krishna, the guide, enlightens him about the causal chains and shows how Arjuna' contribution was minimal.
These systems can easily fail, and they tend to fail in a way that causes them to measure low or zero chlorine and thus overdispense chlorine. More below on why.
First, this means that an operator must always ensure safety, both against excessive chlorine and against insufficient chlorine. In a commercial context, that means that a real human (or maybe a totally different sensor design, e.g. a colorimetric sensor) need to measure the pool chlorine level, preferably with a high quality titration (drop test) every day before opening the pool. They should probably record the result in pen on water resistant paper, but this part is icing on the cake.
Second, hoping that an email gets noticed is ridiculous. If you do not have positive confirmation that the pool is safe to open, don’t open it.
Third, the systems should be sized so that they cannot overdose quickly. The maximum dispensing rate should be such that hours of continuous operation would be required to reach an uncomfortable level, let alone a dangerous level. (Hot tubs are sort of an exception here.)
Fourth, everyone should be using a reasonable amount of CYA in their pool. Even at a lowish level of 30ppm CYA it takes a lot of chlorine to become dangerous unless the operator has also lost control of pH. I realize that some codes are confused about this.
Fifth, chlorine is smelly. Someone should have noticed, even just casually. Admittedly, lots of swimmers may be conditioned to stinky pools, and checking for safety isn’t their job. But the staff should notice.
Sixth, the systems I’ve seen beep when there’s an alert. It’s easy to add flashing lights, too. (In fact, the system I’m familiar with automatically shuts down if it feeds for more than X minutes without reaching the setpoint, and you cannot turn this feature off. You can, however, defeat it by switching the power to the whole controller.)
—- sensors —-
Actual free chlorine sensors intended for pools use an amperometric probe immersed in iodide solution or gel, separated from the pool water by a fancy membrane. Free chlorine oxidizes iodide to iodine, and the sensor measures the iodine concentration. If the membrane fails (or general wear and tear or excessive pressure swings) cause the iodide to be lost, then the chlorine can’t react and the sensor reads zero (or low if there’s tiny bit of iodide left).
Interestingly, these sensors are rather expensive devices that appear to mostly come from France and Germany. The Chinese vendors seem to be rebranding European parts (!), and the major US vendor is very clearly reselling a French company’s product.
There are some vendors who sell a cheap (or absurdly marked up) potentiometric ORP-based closed-loop system. In my considered opinion, these are worse than useless.
Isn't it the chloramines that are smelly? Or at least non free chlorine. A strong chlorine smell is often a sign of a poorly cared for pool or spa
Plain chlorine ought to be noticeable before it sends people to the hospital.
The pool in the article clearly needed more than 30 ppm, they definitely did not sufficiently cover their asses here.